Cyber insider is someone who (knowingly or unknowingly) misuses
legitimate access to commit a malicious act or damage their employer.
It is widely recognised that the threat to enterprises from insider
activities is increasing and that significant costs are being incurred.
Insider act takes place where is often an exploitable weakness with
the employer’s own protective security or management practices which
enables the insider to act.
The following organisational practices were identified as key enablers to an insider act:
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Poor management practices
A general lack of management supervision or oversight of employees meant that many of the behaviours,
problems and activities of the insider were noticed but went unaddressed.
Management failure to address individual issues within the workplace (such as poor relationships with
colleagues, absenteeism or anti-social behaviours) often appears to have resulted in the behaviours
becoming more frequent or extreme.
Management failure to manage and resolve workplace issues (such as boredom or lack of work, overwork,
lack of resources or specific grievances) appears to have contributed to the level of employee disaffection.
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Poor usage of auditing functions
Some organisations had not made regular and systematic use of
their own IT or financial auditing functions to be in a position to
quickly spot irregularities or unusual behaviours.
This enabled insiders to act in the first place and for some to continue acting without detection for longer than necessary.
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Lack of protective security controls
Some organisations had not implemented simple systems for
controlling how employees could introduce or remove organisational data
electronically, and manipulate organisational information remotely
even after their employment had been terminated.
Basic ‘need to know’ principles were not rigorously applied, allowing
some insiders to acquire knowledge they did not actually need for their
job and then use it to commit an insider act.
Lack of segregation of duties was particularly in evidence in process
corruption cases, where one individual would be in a position to
manipulate systems or data without needing approval or endorsement from a
second employee.
The case studies often revealed that a poor security culture
existed in areas where insider acts took place, with a general lack of
adherence to security policies and practices by employees, and with
management being either unaware of these malpractices or failing to deal
with them effectively.
Examples of the most common occurrences were the sharing of security
passwords amongst employees, not locking computer terminals and allowing
others to use logged-on terminals, sensitive materials being left on
desks, security containers being left unlocked and pass access to secure
areas not being enforced.
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Lack of adequate role-based personnel security risk assessment prior to employment
In some insider cases organisations had placed individuals in positions
without considering their suitability for the role and potential
complications that might arise. For example, there were cases where
employees had been placed in roles likely to make them more vulnerable
to compromise due to their nationality,family connections or ideological
sympathies.
There were also cases where the insider simply did not have the
skills, experience or aptitude for the role,and without careful
management, the employee was easily manipulated by a malicious third
party or simply unwittingly committed an insider act.
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Poor pre-employment screening
In a small number of process corruption cases it was evident
that the appropriate level of preemployment screening had not been
undertaken; most notably failures to identify that the individual had a
history of fraudulent behaviour (such as credit card or benefit fraud)
prior to recruitment.
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Poor communication between business areas
The study has shown that if an organisation does not communicate
and share information about threats and risks, but keeps the
information in organisational silos, then its ability to mitigate and
manage insider activity is severely reduced.
The study found cases where counter-productive workplace behaviour
was known in one part of the organisation but had not been shared with
others, resulting in delays to the organisation taking mitigating action
to reduce the risk.
To fully understand the level of risk an employee poses, an
organisation should be able to access information held by Human
Resources concerning performance and welfare issues, information held by
IT about access to electronic data, and Security for physical breaches
of security policies. If information is retained by just one area of the
business the organisation may misjudge the risk that it is carrying.
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Lack of awareness of people risk at a senior level and inadequate governance
A lack of awareness of people risk at a senior level can lead to
organisations missing the attention and resources necessary to address
the insider threat. There needs to be a single, senior, accountable
owner of people risk to whom all managers with a responsibility for
people risk report.
Inadequate corporate governance and unclear policies in managing
people risk and strengthening compliance can also make it more difficult
to prevent and detect insider activity.