The primary difficulty of cyber security isn't technology -- it's
policy. The Internet mirrors real-world society, which makes security
policy online as complicated as it is in the real world. Protecting
critical infrastructure against cyber-attack is just one of cyberspace's
many security challenges, so it's important to understand them all
before any one of them can be solved.
The list of bad actors in cyberspace is long, and spans a wide range
of motives and capabilities. At the extreme end there's cyberwar:
destructive actions by governments during a war. When government
policymakers like David Omand think of cyber-attacks, that's what comes
to mind. Cyberwar is conducted by capable and well-funded groups and
involves military operations against both military and civilian targets.
Along much the same lines are non-nation state actors who conduct
terrorist operations. Although less capable and well-funded, they are
often talked about in the same breath as true cyberwar.
Much more common are the domestic and international criminals who run
the gamut from lone individuals to organized crime. They can be very
capable and well-funded and will continue to inflict significant
economic damage.
Threats from peacetime governments have been seen increasingly in the
news. The US worries about Chinese espionage against Western targets,
and we're also seeing US surveillance of pretty much everyone in the
world, including Americans inside the US. The National Security Agency
(NSA) is probably the most capable and well-funded espionage
organization in the world, and we're still learning about the full
extent of its sometimes illegal operations.
Hacktivists are a different threat. Their actions range from
Internet-age acts of civil disobedience to the inflicting of actual
damage. This is hard to generalize about because the individuals and
groups in this category vary so much in skill, funding and motivation.
Hackers falling under the "anonymous" aegis -- it really isn't correct
to call them a group -- come under this category, as does WikiLeaks.
Most of these attackers are outside the organization, although
whistleblowing -- the civil disobedience of the information age --
generally involves insiders like Edward Snowden.
This list of potential network attackers isn't exhaustive. Depending
on who you are and what your organization does, you might be also
concerned with espionage cyber-attacks by the media, rival corporations
or even the corporations we entrust with our data.
The issue here, and why it affects policy, is that protecting against
these various threats can lead to contradictory requirements. In the
US, the NSA's post-9/11 mission to protect the country from terrorists
has transformed it into a domestic surveillance organization. The NSA's
need to protect its own information systems from outside attack opened
it up to attacks from within. Do the corporate security products we buy
to protect ourselves against cybercrime contain backdoors that allow for
government spying? European countries may condemn the US for spying on
its own citizens, but do they do the same thing?
All these questions are especially difficult because military and
security organizations along with corporations tend to hype particular
threats. For example, cyberwar and cyberterrorism are greatly overblown
as threats -- because they result in massive government programs with
huge budgets and power -- while cybercrime is largely downplayed.
We need greater transparency, oversight and accountability on both
the government and corporate sides before we can move forward. With the
secrecy that surrounds cyber-attack and cyberdefense it's hard to be
optimistic.
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