Friday 10 January 2014

#opIsrael hacks Israeli Aviation Organization - 1800 Flight route leaked

This group claimed that they have been successful in gaining access to the LAN of Israeli Aviation Organization (iaa.gov.il) and has got sensitive information regarding domestic and international flight maps. This site is out of service at the moment.
It is mentioned in the announcement that despite of ability to cause absorptions in services such as flight routing, communications between plane and ground stations, weather condition and etc. this group did not take any action due to humanitarian considerations, but instead wiped the whole server data.
Wikileak.IR cannot confirm this, but published information indicates that they have had full control over the above mentioned site and servers.
This group that introduced itself as “Islamic Cyber Resistance  Group” had gained access to Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) International Airport server in previous operations and published sensitive and vital information regarding infrastructural maps, explosive detection devices and etc.
Read the complete announcement below.
184?md5=ab5e1687c1b3523104933e9c9a4827c6
Once again, Islamic Cyber Resistance Soldiers shook a nest which is weaker than a spider web to make the occupiers realize that now it is time to vanish.
The Islamic Cyber Resistance Group is proud to add another one to its line of success and announces access to the LAN of Israeli aviation organization, in a move to render the fake legend of Israel's security and invincibility obsolete.
By the grace of God, we could gain access to iaa.gov.il LAN and in addition to obtaining sensitive information, seized full control over the management panel.
But as the world knows, killing women, children and innocent people is a profession exclusive to Israel and its neophytes, and we, as ordered by Islam, do condemn such moves and, thus, find it sufficient to release sensitive information to prove that we have had the access to the servers and downed the website.
In this operation,  we gained access to the flight management plans and were able to make online changes to them. Also by gaining access to ATIS/VOLMET system, disruption in data communications (such as flight routing and weather conditions) between plane and ground stations was possible.
Cooperating with our friends in op-Israel, we could maintain our access for months that provided us enough time to download a huge amount of data and analyze and study different modules of Israel's air traveling and aviation systems. This brought us valuable information regarding flight communication structures and processes in Israel.
The information released to the public includes:
1. Domestic and international flight information Database,
2. Some of the flight briefing files which are only provided to pilots and control towers,
3. Management and flight routing software information,
4. Weather condition maps (NOTAM).

At present all the data and information on the server has been wiped and the website is down.
But to those who simply gift death to innocent people:
Be aware that death is close to you,
Closer than what you can even think of,
And is getting closer day by day,
In your army,
In your infrastructure,
In your airplanes,
And in your houses,
We are everywhere to present you a gift,
Which is nothing but death!
So get very well ready for it since you are going to have a painful departure.
The Islamic Cyber Resistance presents this operation to the souls of Islamic Resistance martyrs, Maysara Abu Hamdiya, HassanAbdulAlhlym al-Turabi and Rami Bajes Alzlbany. Prisoners who became martyred innocently in Israeli jails.

Operation POC and Intelligence Code To Enemy Access To Flight Planning and Flight Routing Management
1.png
Access To Many Information About Station And Radars Area
2.png


180?md5=bae15e6b00f1842e7f148bea7e442009
Sample Of Weather Plan And Access To Volmet and NOTOAM

Sample of Pre-Flight Information (ICR Climed Have Many of Them)

Sample Of Access To IAA LAN And Air Side Devices (They Calls Intelligence Code To Enemy )
#########################################################
#                                                       #
#                AIR SIDE CPU Systems                   #
#                                                       #
#########################################################
#
10.14.81.10    iae1    IAE1    aftn1    AFTN1    #    New    aftn1    Air    Side    eth0    LAN    A
#
10.14.81.11    ine1    INE1    notam1    NOTAM1    #    New    aftn1    Air    Side    eth0    LAN    A
#
10.14.81.12    ide1    IDE1    dev1    DEV1    #    New    dev1    Air    Side    eth0    LAN    A
#
172.31.70.2    ibs1    IBS1    pilot1    PILOT1    #    New    pilot1    Air    Side    eth0    LAN    A
#
#########################################################
#                                                       #
#                LAND SIDE CPU Systems                  #
#                                                       #
#########################################################
#
10.14.33.10    iae2    IAE2    aftn2    AFTN2    #    New    aftn2    Land    Side    eth0    LAN    A
#
10.14.33.11    ine2    INE2    notam2    NOTAM2    #    New    aftn2    Land    Side    eth0    LAN    A
#
10.14.33.12    ide2    IDE2    dev2    DEV2    #    New    dev2    Land    Side    eth0    LAN    A
#
172.31.70.3    ibs2    IBS2    pilot2    PILOT2    #    New    pilot2    Land    Side    eth0    LAN    A
#
#########################################################
#########################################################
#                                                       #
#   Moxa Terminal Servers and R6000 Splitter Chassis    #
#                                                       #
#########################################################
#
10.14.81.210    moxa1a    MOXA1A    #    Moxa    CNS2610    Terminal    Server    1a    Air    Side    LAN    A    connected    to    aftn1
10.14.81.211    moxa1b    MOXA1B    #    Moxa    CNS2610    Terminal    Server    1b    Air    Side    LAN    A    connected    to    aftn1
#
10.15.81.210    moxa2a    MOXA2A    #    Moxa    CNS2610    Terminal    Server    2a    Air    Side    LAN    B    connected    to    aftn2
10.15.81.211    moxa2b    MOXA2B    #    Moxa    CNS2610    Terminal    Server    2b    Air    Side    LAN    B    connected    to    aftn2
#
10.14.33.210    moxa1c    MOXA1C    #    Moxa    CNS2610    Terminal    Server    1c    Land    Side    LAN    A    connected    to    aftn1
10.14.33.211    moxa1d    MOXA1D    #    Moxa    CNS2610    Terminal    Server    1d    Land    Side    LAN    A    connected    to    aftn1
#
10.15.33.210    moxa2c    MOXA2C    #    Moxa    CNS2610    Terminal    Server    2c    Land    Side    LAN    B    connected    to    aftn2
10.15.33.211    moxa2d    MOXA2D    #    Moxa    CNS2610    Terminal    Server    2d    Land    Side    LAN    B    connected    to    aftn2
#
10.14.81.212    splitter1    SPLITTER1    #    R6000    Splitter    Chassis    #1    Air    Side    LAN    A
10.14.81.213    splitter2    SPLITTER2    #    R6000    Splitter    Chassis    #2    Air    Side    LAN    A
#
10.14.33.212    splitter3    SPLITTER3    #    R6000    Splitter    Chassis    #3    Land    Side    LAN    A
10.14.33.213    splitter4    SPLITTER4    #    R6000    Splitter    Chassis    #4    Land    Side    LAN    A
10.15.81.7    atis    atis_a    ATIS    ATIS_A    #    ATIS    Server
10.14.81.6    volmet    volmet_a    VOLMET    VOLMET_A    #    VOLMET    Server
10.15.81.10    iae1b    IAE1B    aftn1b    AFTN1B    #    New    aftn1b    Air    Side    eth1    LAN    B
10.15.81.11    ine1b    INE1B    notam1b    NOTAM1B    #    New    aftn1b    Air    Side    eth1    LAN    B
10.15.81.12    ide1b    IDE1B    dev1b    DEV1B    #    New    dev1    Air    Side    eth1    LAN    B
10.15.81.13    ibs1b    IBS1B    pilot1b    PILOT1B    #    New    pilot1    Air    Side    eth1    LAN    B
10.15.33.10    iae2b    IAE2B    aftn2b    AFTN2B    #    New    aftn2b    Land    Side    eth1    LAN    B
10.15.33.11    ine2b    INE2B    notam2b    NOTAM2B    #    New    aftn2b    Land    Side    eth1    LAN    B
10.15.33.12    ide2b    IDE2B    dev2b    DEV2B    #    New    dev2    Land    Side    eth1    LAN    B
10.15.33.13    ibs2b    IBS2B    pilot2b    PILOT2B    #    New    pilot2    Land    Side    eth1    LAN    B
10.15.81.1    old_iae1b    OLD_IAE1B    old_aftn1b    OLD_AFTN1B    #    Operational    no.1,    tu1
10.15.33.2    old_iae2b    OLD_IAE2B    old_aftn2b    OLD_AFTN2B    #    Operational    no.2,    tu1
10.15.81.3    old_ine1b    OLD_INE1B    old_notam1b    OLD_NOTAM1B    #    AIS    no.1,    tu1
10.15.33.4    old_ine2b    OLD_INE2B    old_notam2b    OLD_NOTAM2B    #    AIS    no.2,    tu1
10.15.81.5    old_ide1b    OLD_IDE1B    #    Development    no.1,    tu1
10.14.33.51    xpc11    XPC11    #    Xwindows    PC    no.11
10.15.81.74    xpc12    XPC12    #    Xwindows    PC    no.12
10.15.81.73    xpc10    XPC10    #    Xwindows    PC    no.10
10.14.81.7    atis_b    ATIS_B    #    ATIS_B    Server
10.15.81.6    volmet_b    VOLMET_B    #    VOLMET_B    Server
#OVO servers
10.2.90.203     robigo
10.2.33.203     lucifer
10.3.250.24    vmappolo
1800 Flight Route Leaked Here
PART1    https://www.quickleak.org/myWprF5O
PART2    https://www.quickleak.org/x3vWBDqT
PART3    https://www.quickleak.org/rPXwmrRa
PART4    https://www.quickleak.org/W9sxUNcq
PART5    https://www.quickleak.org/lHUbBNbQ
PART6    https://www.quickleak.org/AnRvVS0f
PART7    https://www.quickleak.org/tHt1lIif
PART8    https://www.quickleak.org/wV9VAsRc
PART9    https://www.quickleak.org/9xQ2feOv
PART10    https://www.quickleak.org/cNVYDNCf 

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